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Abstract. This paper proposes the Intra Trustcenter Protocol (ITP),
a flexible and secure management protocol for communication between
arbitrary trustcenter components. Unlike other existing protocols (like
PKCS#7, CMP or XKMS) ITP focuses on the communication within
a trustcenter. It is powerful enough for transferring complex messages
which are machine and human readable and easy to understand. In ad-
dition it includes an extension mechanism to be prepared for future de-
velopments.
Keywords. Certificate Lifecycle, Certificate Management, Public Key
Infrastructure, Trustcenter, XML, XML Signature, XML Encryption.
1 Introduction
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to provide security of communica-
tion in electronic processes like Internet and e-commerce. Most implementations
and specifications (e.g. [RFC3280], [RFC2510], [RFC2511]) consider hierarchical
PKIs where trust into the authenticity of all keys depends on a Certification Au-
thority (CA) and sometimes on an optional Registration Authority (RA). But
one can easily think of more authorities in the PKI and trustcenter environment.
Trustcenter software has to provide a great variety of services each carried
out by complex processes like registration, key generation, certification, person-
alisation of personal security environments, key backup and many more. Each
service has different requirements on the operational environment. The require-
ments may even alter when the trustcenter has to adapt to different situations.
A common technique in software engineering to meet the demands of an adap-
tive software is to break it up into components, each covering certain operational
aspects. These components can then be distributed according to the needs of the
special environment. Even more, certain components can be replaced to reflect
changes in the environment and so on. Clearly, a component based approach
to complex processes needs well suited means of communication among these
components. Furthermore, this communication is a grand issue to the overall
security of the trustcenter.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper we propose a new protocol which is well suited for the communi-
cation between arbitrary trustcenter components. The proposed protocol takes
a look into an area which current standards do not address, namely the com-
munication between arbitrary trustcenter components. Section 2 names already
existing protocols and discusses their properties. Secondly, we list the require-
ments for intra-trustcenter communication which serve as design criteria for our
protocol. This is discussed in Section 3. Moreover we motivate the use of XML
for specifying the syntax of our protocol, since XML is a well accepted means for
specifying data structures. XML comes with sophisticated security mechanisms
which we employed to guarantee integrity, authenticity and confidentiality as well
as enforce operational security constraints as roles or dual control. Furthermore,
the syntax of the protocol is given along with an example from a trustcenter
scenario. These can be found in Section 4. In Section 5 the protocol is analysed
regarding its flexibility and security along with its deployment considerations.
Lastly, Section 6 gives an outlook on further developments of the protocol.
2 Certificate and Certification Protocols
The existing proposals and standards concerning certificate and certification
management can be divided into three groups.
The first one consists of the ”Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard”
[PKCS7] and ”Certification Request Syntax Standard” [PKCS10]. They were
developed by RSA Laboratories and describe message formats in ASN.1 [X.680].
PKCS#10 is only suitable for an end-entity to provide a to be certified public
key to a trustcenter and thus is not general enough for intra-trustcenter commu-
nication. PKCS#7 comes in two modes: In the more general one it can be used
as a container for transporting arbitrary data in a secure way. This of course can
also be employed within a trustcenter. But it has the disadvantage that it does
not consider the transported content, leading therefore to coarser security mech-
anisms. In the special enrollment mode it is only usable for delivering certificates
and certificate revocation lists and thus not general enough.
The second group contains two protocol standards published by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). These are the CMP [RFC2510] and the CMC
[RFC2797] specifications. They, in turn, are based on the CRMF [RFC2511] and
CMS [RFC2630] formats which play a similar role as PKCS#10 and PKCS#7,
respectively. They are all specified in ASN.1. These protocols focus on scenarios
where communication takes place between an end-entity, a certification authority
and optionally a registration authority. Thus they can not be employed for the
communication between arbitrary components.
A rather new development is the ”XML Key Management Specification”
[XKMS] which was proposed by the W3C and arose from the need for a key man-
agement protocol for the XML signature [XMLSig] and encryption [XMLEnc]
standards. It is not appropriate for intra-trustcenter communication since it fo-
cuses on the communication between end-entities and trustcenters.
Only the CMP and PKCS#7 specifications can be actually considered related
work to our protocol, since they are used for the purpose of communication inside
a trustcenter. However, as we already pointed out there are some considerations
using these protocols inside the trustcenter and our approach offers an alternative
to these two specifications.
3 Protocol Criteria
This section focuses on the qualities a communication protocol between trust-
center components should have. The criteria that should apply to the protocol
itself (how should it be) are named, along with a discussion on the motivation
behind them.
3.1 Design criteria
This subsection shows the criteria that must apply to a protocol for intra-
trustcenter communication. This list is partly based on the design goals of other
protocols (e.g [RFC2510], [XKMS]) and partly on what we have encountered
while setting up trustcenters for different projects.
1. Generality The protocol must be able to handle all kind of data which may
be passed between trustcenter components. It must not put any restrictions
upon the number and type of components the trustcenter is composed of.
The protocol should allow to express the data in a structured manner when
possible (i.e. not just binary). 3
As the security and flexibility mechanisms of the protocol have to apply to
all messages, it is clear that all possible messages must be presentable within
the protocol. In order to be able to apply different mechanisms4 to different
parts of the message it must be well structured.
2. Extensibility The protocol must allow to be extended by new messages, data
types or components.
This is necessary to be able to meet future requirements, like new trustcenter
products or special request types.
3. Independency The protocol has to be independent from the structure and
workflow of the trustcenter. This includes the independence of any means
of transportation, including transport media, online versus offline transport,
security and protection issues.
This is to meet all possible connection types for the trustcenter components
and all policies which might be applied.
3 signatures will surely be binary data
4 e.g. encryption of parts of the message
4. Automation The protocol must allow the automation of trustcenter pro-
cesses.
The trustcenter may automate some processes. The protocol must not pro-
hibit this. This includes especially the authentication mechanisms.
5. Scalability The protocol must scale with the size of the public key infrastruc-
ture, the security level and the complexity of the trustcenter installation.
Different trustcenters have different complexity, size and security level. In
addition these parameters may change in the lifetime of a trustcenter. The
protocol has to deal with these facts.
6. Traceability The protocol has to allow the tracing of messages, applications
and products. The messages have to be human readable where possible.5
As trustcenters are highly security sensitive applications there will be a lot
of auditing and quality insurance means applied to them. The protocol must
support this. Additionally this eases the debugging or error search.
7. Security The protocol messages (or parts of it) have to be able to be secured
(i.e. authentic, unaltered and secret). Additionally the protocol must support
common authorisation techniques (e.g. dual control, delegation). It must be
possible to achieve this with any cryptographic algorithm or data structure,
regarding both the communicated data and the protection of the protocol
messages itself.
As the intra-trustcenter communication is a major issue in the security of
the whole trustcenter the protocol must support all means for protecting this
communication. As the field of cryptography develops, the protocol must be
able to adjust the means of protection to the current state of the art.
4 The ITP Protocol
4.1 Why to use XML?
XML is ideal for describing structured data. Applications using XML can define
a special syntax in order to describe the data that should be used inside the ap-
plication. For example a special tag <X509Certificate> can describe an X.509
certificate while the tag <revocationPassword> describes the revocation pass-
word that an end-user would like to use. This flexible data format is perfectly
suited for defining the structures of ITP.
This data format is in addition portable. Data described in XML can be
exchanged between applications which are XML aware and almost all program-
ming languages support XML. Introducing document type definition (DTD) or
XML schema, the tags and structure of the XML document are constrained to
the rules applied from the DTD or schema. This can be used to avoid errors in
the XML structure.
XML documents are both human and machine readable. This is a signif-
icant property of an XML document in cases where humans should examine
the correctness of data. For example the subject distinguished name (DN) that
5 encrypted parts will surely be binary data
should be placed in the certificate can be such data. This can be described in
the <subjectDN> tag (e.g. <subjectDN>CN=Alice Cryptographer, O=MyOrg,
C=DE</subjectDN>). While a machine can examine if this tag contains correct
data it can not examine whether the name Alice Cryptographer really exists. A
human administrator on the contrary can examine the credentials of the entity
and decide whether such a value for this tag is valid or not.
XML supports also digital signatures [XMLSig] and encryption [XMLEnc].
Moreover it supports different cryptographic mechanisms (like RSA, DSA or
ECDSA in the future) providing therefore security related to different mathe-
matical problems (factoring and discrete logarithm problem). Another possibility
that the signature framework has to offer is that XML structures can be multi-
ply signed from one, two or more different entities (this can include also physical
persons) as well as ability to sign certain portions of the whole structure. For
example in the case of dual control the presence of two signatures is required.
Lastly, using XML someone can prevent the use of ASN.1 structures for ex-
changing such messages. Applications can avoid the step of implementing these
special and in several cases complicated structures just to serve the communi-
cation between trustcenter components. The description of the ITP messages in
XML is quite simple to implement and use and does not require special software
(for example a library for ASN.1).
4.2 ITP messages
ITP consists of XML messages exchanged between components inside the trust-
center. The most significant element is an <application> which encapsulates
all data that is exchanged between such components.
Application An <application> represents a request for a trustcenter com-
ponent to deliver a certain service.6 In principal, every component can form
an <application> and head it to any other component. The basic idea is the
following: In order to have a trustcenter execute a certain task, one or more struc-
tures of type <application> are generated. Each <application> is routed from
component to component. Each component performs its service and, if neces-
sary, modifies the <application> by adding, changing or removing parts of it.
Thus, an <application> contains the pieces of data needed to accomplish a
task as well as it determines how this data should be processed. The syntax of
an <application> can be found in Figure 1.
An <application>mandatorily owns the attribute id which uniquely identi-
fies it. If the same application travels among different components this id always
remains unchanged. By this traceability of applications can be achieved. Further-
more, replay of already processed applications can be prevented. This is of great
importance since a trustcenter may have to guarantee that certain services are
6 we have chosen the name <application> instead of <request> since every request
is actually a form (like an application form) from which every component extracts
information that it needs and fills the form with the information it produces
<message version="1.0" id="123456789">
<sender>Registration</sender>
<recipient>Certification</recipient>
<application id="12345678">
<profile id="ProfileId">
<element1Name>value</element1Name>
<element2Name>value</element2Name>
<!-- ... more elements -->
</profile>
<ds:Signature> <!-- signature elements... --> </ds:Signature>
<!-- ... more signatures -->
</application>
<!-- ..... more applications -->
<ds:Signature> <!-- signature elements... --> </ds:Signature>
<!-- ..... more signatures -->
</message>
Fig. 1. Syntax of an ITP message
carried out at most once per request (e.g. a request for just one certificate should
under no circumstances lead to more than one certificate being issued).
The tag <profile> determines by its unique attribute id the kind of applica-
tion. The most basic ones concern issuing certificates and processing revocations,
but other may be added as well. It is also possible to provide <profile>-ids for
communicating meta information within the trustcenter.
The <profile> also defines, how the applications are processed and which
components are involved at which stage of procession. This, among others, in-
cludes whether a key-pair is to be created in the trustcenter or provided by the
end-entity, possibly along with some proof-of-possession data, or if some kind of
key backup has to be done. Since it is left to the components, how to accomplish
their services in detail, it is also they who have to interpret the <profile>-ids.
This mechanism enables ITP to transport arbitrary requests.
Within the <profile>-tag the pieces of data are included. Most prominent
among them are certificates and CRLs. Apart from this other data can be met
like passwords, end-entity data or trustcenter functional data. For example this
could be the last and first name of a person for an application to registration
or the subject DN for an application to the certification component. In any case
a way to express this data is needed. This is a special XML tag that describes
each of them. The usual data exchanged among the components possess their
own tag but it is possible to define new tags that represent data which are needed
in order for an application to be complete.
Application signature An <application>may contain one or more elements
<ds:Signature> of type enveloped signature according to the XML signature
standard as described in [XMLSig]). These signatures are calculated over the
<application> by the last component which altered its content. By this, the
changes are authorised. The destination component which imports the applica-
tion may verify the signature of the application. In addition, it is possible for
components to sign certain portions of an <application>. XML signatures al-
low signing of a given path inside an XML structure. This gives a component
the ability to sign only the data it creates and actually is responsible for. In
addition with the possibility to calculate and append more that one signature
over an <application> the last can travel among the trustcenter components,
which now verify the signature only over data that they need to operate. Fur-
thermore dual control can be enabled with two participants signing the XML
structure appending both signatures at the <application> (one participant can
be a trustcenter administrator).
We see that with the use of XML signatures, as well as the ability to define a
new <application> and express all possible data inside a trustcenter we achieve
the two goals of ITP. That is security and flexibility.
Message The element that is root of every ITP message is the <message>.
A <message> element contains two attributes. The first one is the version
attribute to denote the version of ITP in use. Current version is ”1.0”. The
second one is the id attribute. The id attribute holds a unique number among
messages for each message. Therefore each component can recognise whether it
has already processed this message or not. In addition a <message>must contain
the <sender> and <recipient> elements.
The <sender> element describes the component sending the <application>.
This can be an IP address or even a symbolic name known inside the trustcenter.
Name resolving based on an IP is for example ideal in an environment in which
the trustcenter components operate in different hosts and based on the symbolic
name in the case where the components are found in the same host. The same
rule applies to the <recipient> element used to hold information about the
component to which the message is destined for.
Inside the trustcenter a peer-to-peer communication may exist, where ev-
ery component can communicate with another component. For example, the
CA should be able to receive messages from different RAs, send messages to a
backup component as well as to a Directory Services component. We see that
this protocol is flexible on the naming of every peer and the problem of defining
the source and the destination of the messages is solved.
A <message> is a container for <application> elements. A <message> may
contain one or more <application> elements. For example the registration com-
ponent sends three certification requests at the same time. One can be a request
for an encryption key-pair, the second for a signature and the third for a non-
repudiation. In this case it must envelope three <application> elements inside
the <message>. Of course a new <application> (see also 4.3) can be defined,
which represents exactly this use case and therefore only one <application> is
needed, demonstrating the flexibility of the proposed scheme. A complete ITP
message can be seen in Figure 1.
A <message> can also be secured with an XML signature. The same proper-
ties as in the signing of an <application> element apply to this case.
4.3 An example of the protocol
In order to demonstrate the use of the protocol we construct the following sce-
nario. This scenario consists of a Registration and a Certification component
(which is offline) as well as a Directory Services component. All components
have multi-client capability and they can operate for different virtually hosted
CAs. In addition, two trustcenter administrator (operators) must sign all request
coming to the offline Certification component.
Alice, who belongs to organisation A, wants to get three certificates. One for
encryption, one for digital signature and one for non-repudiation. In addition
she provides a revocation password to be used in case of revocation. She also
wants her certificates to be publicly available.
Alice makes a certification request to the Registration component which ex-
amines the credentials of Alice. It checks that they are valid and sends a mes-
sage to Certification component for the special certification request (known to
the system with the id “MultiCert”). This message contains the subject DN
for the certificate, the virtual CA that it should sign the certificates, the hash
value of the revocation password, information whether the certificates should
be published or not and the e-mail address of Alice. It then writes the message
with one application and signs the application to provide authenticity. Lastly,
two trustcenter operators sing the message too, in order to be accepted from the
Certification component. The message can be seen in Figure 2. This message
is written in a portable media and is manually transported to the Certification
component (since it is offline) from the two operators.
The Certification component imports the message, verifies the signatures of
the operators over the application and logs their identities with the subject DN
of each operator certificate.7 It then verifies the signature of the Registration
component, creates all three certificates (signed with the key of the appropriate
virtual CA) and changes and adds information to the application into a new
message to the Directory Services. It also signs the application to provide au-
thenticity and integrity of the data. The key used for signing should not be the
same as the one used for signing the certificates. In addition, the signatures in
the messages exchanged between components are operational signatures with-
out any special properties. The message (seen in Figure 3) is transfered to the
Directory Services.
7 such a requirement may appear when it comes to evaluation of the Certification
component
<message version="1.0" id="20040202164445">
<sender>Registration</sender>
<recipient>Certification</recipient>
<application id="20040202164832">
<profile id="MultiCert">
<clientName>Host A</clientName>
<subjectDN>CN=Alice,OU=OrgUnitName,O=OrgName,C=DE</subjectDN>
<revocationPassword>7c4a8 ... 8941c</revocationPassword>
<email>alice@orgunitname.orgname.de</email>
<publiclyAvailable>true</publiclyAvailable>
</profile>
<ds:Signature> other signature elements .... </ds:Signature>
<ds:Signature> signature of first operator </ds:Signature>
<ds:Signature> signature of second operator </ds:Signature>
</application>
</message>
Fig. 2. Registration to Certification message
Lastly, the Directory Services component verifies the signature. Afterwards
it examines whether the certificates should be published or not (specified in the
<publiclyAvailable> tag), it publishes them and sends Alice a notification by
e-mail with the certificates attached.
In this scenario two messages were created. One from Registration to Certi-
fication and one from Certification to Directory Services. Both refer to the same
application. Therefore the id of the application must remain the same. Another
remark is that the <subjectDN> field of the first message is missing in the second
message. This field is of great importance for the Certification component, since
if this field is missing it can not issue the certificates, but of no importance for
the Directory Services component. In addition the subject’s DN is now contained
in the certificates.
5 Analysis of ITP
ITP aims at a secure and flexible protocol for the communication between trust-
center components. The mechanisms that ITP has to offer enable these two goals
inside the trustcenter.
5.1 Flexibility
ITP messages can travel among all trustcenter components. The sender and
recipient tags of a message resolve the addressing problem. Every component
is in position to set these tags according to the desired flow of information. In
addition, the number of the operating components can vary without affecting
the protocol itself.
<message version="1.0" id="20040202170134">
<sender>Certification</sender>
<recipient>Directory Services</recipient>
<application id="20040202164832">
<profile id="MultiCert">
<clientName>Host A</clientName>
<encCertificate>Base64 encoded certificate</encCertificate>
<signCertificate>Base64 encoded certificate</signCertificate>
<nonRepCertificate>Base64 encoded certificate</nonRepCertificate>
<revocationPassword>7c4a8 ... 8941</revocationPassword>
<email>alice@orgunitname.orgname.de</email>
<publiclyAvailable>true</publiclyAvailable>
</profile>
<ds:Signature> other signature elements .... </ds:Signature>
</application>
</message>
Fig. 3. Certification to Directory Services message
All kind of data inside the trustcenter can be transported with ITP. Both
binary data (like the X.509 certificate) and simple text can be send along with
an ITP message.
There is the possibility to define new tags and applications. Therefore, ITP
is in position to meet new requirements in the trustcenter communication. This
may occur in cases where the communicated data or the services offered from
the trustcenter change.
ITP messages are XML messages and thus can be send with various mech-
anisms. These may include HTTP(S), TCP/IP, email or even a floppy disc. In
addition, the messages themselves are portable among applications since they are
described in XML. Moreover they can be read from humans as well as machines.
The messages and applications can be tracked. Every message and application
possesses a unique id. This enables the components or the administrators to keep
a history of past messages or applications. In addition, the flow of information
inside the trustcenter can be followed. This is especially useful in cases where
auditing or special logging is required.
5.2 Security
ITP offers integrity, authenticity and confidentiality to the communication of a
trustcenter’s components. It further supports authorisation mechanisms.
Messages can be secured for confidentiality. The whole message or portions
of it may be encrypted. Candidates for such an action may be values like the
private key of an end-entity, the revocation password or even the postal address
of the end-user.
It is possible to calculate a signature over a message, an application or certain
data inside an application. This makes it possible to provide authenticity as well
as integrity for these values.
ITP messages may be signed from one or more components or administrators.
This enables dual or multi control. This kind of control is met very often in high
level security trustcenters.
5.3 Deploying ITP
ITP, as described in this paper, can be used from trustcenters which seek a
method for arranging their information flow inside the trustcenter, independently
of the number and nature of components and services as well as the kind of
information communicated among them. This is a significant step, since the
communication between arbitrary trustcenter components with the requirements
mentioned in Section 3 is difficult to achieve and existent solutions do not provide
this functionality (instead of, most of them are standardised). At the moment
ITP can be used only for intra-trustcenter specific implementations. A newer
version of ITP is needed that specifies the ITP messages, in order for them to
describe most of the tasks inside a trustcenter in a standardised way that will
enable interoperability of different implementations.
6 Future Work
We proposed ITP, an XML-based protocol for intra-trustcenter communication.
We introduced the design criteria of our protocol, argued on their usefulness and
reasoned on whether these criteria have been met or not. We specified the 1.0
version of ITP along with an example extracted from a real scenario.
But a lot of work still needs to be done. Our next goal is to design and
implement ITP version 2.0, a fully-fledged protocol with extended functionality
and strictly defined rules and structure (work towards a standardised version).
We further want to investigate the use of criticality flags for the various tags
of the protocol messages. Towards this direction considerations on whether all
messages should default to non-critical or which actions should be taken if a crit-
icality rule is violated should be made. A mechanism for error handling should
also be integrated in the protocol with clearly defined exceptions (like signa-
ture verification failed or application has already been processed) and exception
identifiers (ids). In addition a more advanced signing policy mechanism can be
integrated. With this mechanism it can be regulated whether components are
allowed to change data from the initial application and therefore destroy the
original signature and its validity. Special care should be taken on examining
the trade-offs between simplicity and extended functionality.
References
RFC2510. C. Adams, S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, March 1999.
AL99. C. Adams, S. Lloyd, Understanding Public-Key Infrastructure: Concepts, Stan-
dards and Deployment Considerations, New Riders Publishing, 1999.
RFC2630. R. Housley, Cryptographic Message Syntax, Request for Comments 2630,
June 1999.
HP01. R. Housley, T. Polk, Planning for PKI, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001.
RFC3280. R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo, Internet X.509 Public Key In-
frastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, Request for
Comments 3280, April 2002.
RFC2511. M. Myers, C. Adams, D. Solo D. Kemp, Internet X.509 Certificate Request
Message Format, Request for Comments 2511, March 1999.
RFC2797. M. Myers, X. Liu, J. Schaad, J. Weinstein, Certificate Management Mes-
sages over CMS, Request for Comments 2797, April 2000.
RFC2314. B. Kaliski, PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Version 1.5, Request
for Comments 2314, March 1998.
RFC2315. B. Kaliski, PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5, Request
for Comments 2315, March 1998.
PKCS7. RSA Laboratories, PKCS#7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard,
November 1993.
PKCS10. RSA Laboratories, PKCS#10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard,
May 2000.
PKCS12. RSA Laboratories, PKCS#12 v1.0: Personal Information Exchange Syntax,
June 1999.
XML. Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition),
http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml (24 Jan. 2004).
XKMS. XML Key Management Specification (XKMS),
http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/NOTE-xkms-20010330/ (9 Feb. 2004).
XMLEnc. XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ (9 Feb. 2004).
XMLSig. XML-Signature Syntax and Processing,
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/ (24 Jan. 2004).
X.509. ITU-T Recommendation X.509, Information Technology - Open Systems Inter-
connection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, August 1997.
X.680. ITU-T Recommendation X.680, Information Technology - Abstract Syntax No-
tation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation, July 2002.
PKCS#10 (RFC2314)
XKMS
PKCS#7 (RFC2315)
CMS (RFC2630)
CMP (RFC2510)
CRMF (RFC2511)
CMC (RFC2797)
                     secure environment
secure environment
$
certification
registration
administration
certificate management
mobile registration
key backup
trus
tce
n
ter 
bo
u
n
da
ry
key generation
LDAP-Server 1
LDAP-Server 2
OCSP responder
